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WRONGFUL LIFE: BIRTH CONTROL
SPAWNS A TORT
INTRODUCTION

The birth control revolution 1 has spawned the development
of a new basis of tort liability. During the past two decades,
sweeping changes have occurred in the availability 2 and social
acceptance 3 of both permanent 4 and temporary 5 contraception
and pregnancy termination techniques. 6 This societal transformation was expedited by the United States Supreme Court's
1. Birth control is not of modern invention. Contraception has been
practiced in some form for at least several thousand years. Aristotle wrote
that conception could be prevented by "anointing that part of the womb on
which the seeds fall with oil of cedar, or with ointment of lead or with frankincense commingled with olive oil." The "condom," the first modern
method of contraception, was mass produced in the 1840's. The "diaphragm" was developed after the invention of vulcanized rubber but had its
roots in earlier primitive devices. The two newest methods of birth control
are the intra-uterine device- (IUD)and oral contraceptives (the "Pill"). See
note 5 infra; L. WESTOFF & C. WESTOFF, FROM NOW TO ZERO-FERTILrrY, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN AMERICA 40-45 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
WESTOFF & WESTOFF].

2. Three United States Supreme Court decisions guarantee that meaningful reproductive choices are available to all persons. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), held that a state statute outlawing the
dissemination of birth control information to married people "would unjustifiably intrude on rights of marital privacy which are constitutionally protected." Id. at 497. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), indicated that
the guarantee of privacy extended to single as well as married persons. Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), struck down a Texas criminal abortion statute
on the ground that a constitutional right to privacy included a woman's unconditional right to terminate her pregnancy in the first trimester. See generally Commentary, Pregnancy,Privacy, and the Constitution: The Court at
the Crossroads,25 U. FLA. L. REV. 779 (1973).
3. The wide-ranging social acceptance of birth control is best evidenced by the attitude of Roman Catholic American women. A 1969 study
showed that 63% of this group were opposed to the papal ban on contraception. WESTOFF & WESTOFF, supra note 1, at 203.
4. Permanent contraception is sterilization. In the male, this is accomplished by a vasectomy-the surgical severance of the vas deferens through
which the sperm travel. Hackett & Waterhouse, Vasectomy-Reviewed, 116
AM. L. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 438, 443 (1973). In the female, the more
complicated tubal ligation is required. This is the surgical interruption of
the Fallopian tubes so that the eggs cannot enter the uterine cavity where
fertilization takes place. Thompson, Haverkamp & Drose, Sterilization of
the Female, 70 ROCKY MTN. MED. J. 431, 432 (1973).
5. Temporary contraceptive measures include the oral contraceptive
(the "Pill"), the intra-uterine device, and spermicides. See Comment, The
Pill-A Legal and Social Dilemma, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 484, 497 (1972).
6. Termination of pregnancy is accomplished by an abortion, "the expulsion of the fetus at a period of utero-gestation so early that it has not
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recognition of an individual's right to determine his or her reproductive destiny.7 When, however, this right is wrongfully interfered with, and the birth of a child results, the courts must
decide whether a cause of action exists and, if so, what damages
are recoverable.
Actions for wrongful life8 are attempts by injured plaintiffs
to explore the limits of professional malpractice liability where,
acquired the power of sustaining an independent life." People v. Heisler,
300 Ill.
98, 100, 132 N.E. 802, 803 (1921).
7. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a synopsis of the Supreme
Court trilogy on reproductive rights, see note 2 supra.
8. The term "wrongful life," in addition to serving as a generic term for
different actions brought by the parents of an unplanned child, also encompasses actions brought on behalf of the infant born of the negligence and
actions by the siblings of the infant. The infant plaintiff in a wrongful life
action asserts that his very existence under some condition is wrongful.
For example, such actions have been asserted where the child is born illegitimate. E.g., Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963)
(infant sued his father for tort of "bastardy," court, while admitting tort had
been alleged, refused to allow cause of action which could have such "farreaching" results); cf. Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276
N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (rejecting illegitimate child's claim for damages where
birth resulted from rape of mother while she was in state mental hospital).
See generally Note, Compensationfor the Harmful Effects of Illegitimacy,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1966).
Wrongful life actions have also been brought against physicians by infants for failure to diagnose birth defects. The allegation is not that the physician's negligence caused the plaintiff's condition, but that it caused the
plaintiff to be born in an impaired state. Compare Bergstreser v. Mitchell,
577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (finding that infant had stated a cause of action
for injuries resulting from a negligent Caesarean section to the mother two
years before its birth) and Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (sustaining infant's cause of action for injuries resulting
from negligent transfusion of her Rh-negative mother with Rh-positive
blood some nine years prior to child's conception) with Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (dismissing infant's claim for damages
against physician who negligently failed to advise mother of risks of birth
defects). Essentially the infant's claim is that its very existence is wrongful. Such claims by infant plaintiffs have been uniformly dismissed. The
reason given by most courts in denying recovery is that compensation is
impossible to determine because no comparison can be made between life
with defects and no life at all. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 28,
227 A.2d at 692, stating: "The infant plaintiff would have us measure the
difference between his life with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determination." See generally
Note, Fatherand Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians'
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978).
Wrongful life claims have also been asserted against physicians by the
siblings of unplanned or deformed infants. The damage alleged consists of
a diminution of their share of parental love, affection and financial support
due to the infant's birth. No court has allowed recovery. See Aronoff v.
Snider, 292 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (court stated: 'The con-

cept of a cause of action in children for [wrongful life] is without foundation

in law or logic"); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (basing denial of cause of action upon absence of any enforceable
claim on part of children to their parents' services). Claims by the infant
and his siblings for wrongful life will not be discussed textually. See gener-

1980]

Wrongful Life

for example, a negligent sterilization is performed; 9 where prescriptions for contraceptives are carelessly dispensed by a pharmacist;' 0 where an abortion is negligently not brought to
fruition;" and where a mother is unable to make an informed
decision on whether to complete the reproductive process because her pregnancy was inadvertently misdiagnosed, 12 or because the effects on the fetus of an existing condition, such as
rubella, were improperly predicted. 13 The net effect of the negligence is the birth of a child who must be nurtured and educated.
toll
If the child is born defective, the financial and emotional
14
upon the parents may be inconceivably extensive.
The term "wrongful life" functions as a broad umbrella
under which plaintiffs, alleging these factually divergent
wrongs, have sought judicial recognition of their claims. Various causes of action subsumed under the general heading of
"wrongful life" are differentiated both by the manner in which
the malpractice defendant's negligence impinges upon the
plaintiff's reproductive rights and by the damages claimed. For
example, "wrongful conception" describes those wrongful life
cases in which the plaintiffs right to prevent conception is infringed by a physician's negligent failure to sterilize.' 5 The
ally Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liabilityfor the Birth of the
Unplanned Child, 39 ALa. L. REV. 221 (1975).
9. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967).
10. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
11. See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479
(1979).
12. See, e.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d
242 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
14. For example, the annual cost of care for a child born with the
dreaded Tay-Sachs disease is $20,000-$40,000. The national expenditure for
health care of those afflicted with Down's Syndrome (mongolism) has been
estimated to be at least one billion dollars per year. H.R. REP. No. 498, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
709, 727. The parents' psychological suffering is also striking. The birth of a
defective child often causes the parents "shock and denial, anxiety, anger
and/or guilt, and depression." Griffin, Kavanagh & Sorenson, Genetic
Knowledge, Client Perspectives, and Genetic Counseling: A Consumers'
View, 2 Soc. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 171, 174 (1976-1977)

(citing Falech &

Britton, Phases in Coping: The Hypothesis and Its Implications, 21 Soc. BiOLOGY 1 (1974)). This emotional toll has been judicially recognized. See
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 434, 404 A.2d 8, 17 (1979) (Handler, J., dissenting) ("Without doubt, expectant parents, kept in ignorance of severe and
permanent defects affecting their unborn child, suffer greatly when the awful truth dawns upon them with the birth of the child").
15. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn.
1977) ("an action for 'wrongful conception' may be maintained [by the parents of an unplanned child who was born after a negligent sterilization],
and that compensatory damages [including the costs of rearing the child]
may be recovered. . . .") Wrongful conception cases may also arise where
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cause of action accrues at conception since the negligence nullifies plaintiff's right to prevent fertilization.
"Wrongful pregnancy"'16 is an action which has also been
classified under the rubric of wrongful life. "Wrongful pregnancy" is distinguishable from "wrongful conception" only in
the damages alleged to have been suffered.' 7 The latter action
demands all damages flowing from the negligence, including the
costs of rearing the child to maturity. "Wrongful pregnancy" relief, however, includes only reimbursement for the cost of the
negligent treatment and damages arising from the pregnancy itself. Recovery for expenses incurred in raising the child are not
demanded.
Those wrongful life cases in which the negligent act infringes the exercise of the mother's right to terminate her pregnancy give rise to an action termed "wrongful birth."'18 The
physician in such a case may have negligently misinformed the
mother about the possibility of birth defects. Since the mother
made the decision to become pregnant, the conception and pregnancy are not the basis of the claimed injury. Rather, the birth
of the child which would otherwise have been aborted is asserted to be wrongful.
Jointly, these actions constitute the basis for redress of negligent interference with plaintiffs' reproductive rights. This
comment will examine the recoverable damages in the parental
cause of action' 9 for wrongful life; the term being used throughout to encompass wrongful conception, wrongful pregnancy, and
wrongful birth. Initially, the historical development of the cause
a prescription for oral contraceptives is negligently filled. See, e.g., Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1970).

16. See, e.g., Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App.
453, 460, 268 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1978) (court distinguished wrongful conception

cases from case at bar, stating: "A more appropriate resolution of the difficulties presented, and the one hereby adopted, is to view the action as one

for 'wrongful pregnancy'.

. . thereby

limiting the scope of the injury to the

very real expenses and obvious difficulties attending the unexpected pregnancy of a woman") (quoting Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del.
Super. 1974), afd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975)).

17. In both wrongful conception and wrongful pregnancy actions, the
fact clusters are similar. For example, the child in either case might be

born of the negligence of the sterilizing physician. The difference between
the actions is that in wrongful pregnancy the parents do not recover the
costs of rearing the child.
18. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (parents of

mongoloid child stated cause of action for "wrongful birth"; parents alleged
that physician had negligently failed to advise 38 year-old mother of high
risk of birth defects in children born to women of that age).
19. This comment will exclude from further discussion those actions asserted by the infant born of the negligence as well as those by the siblings
of the unplanned or defective child. See note 8 supra.
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of action will be surveyed. Attention will then be directed to
Wilczynski v. Goodman,20 a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision which sustained a parent's action predicated on a negligent
abortion. The Wilczynski holding and its supporting rationale
on the issue of damages will be analyzed and compared with recent decisions in other jurisdictions. Finally, proposed methods
for determining recoverable damages will be scrutinized with
complete compensation advocated for all damages proximately
caused by the tortious interference with reproductive decisionmaking.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF ACTION

Public Policy as a Basisfor Denial
In its inception, the parental cause of action for wrongful life
met with judicial disapproval. The first court confronted with
the claim that the birth of a child was a legal damage refused to
recognize the cause of action. Christensen v. Thornby,21 rather
than regarding the birth as an injury resulting from a negligent
vasectomy, perceived it as a "blessing" to the plaintiff. 22 While
the "blessing" barrier to recovery suggested that legal damage,
an essential element of tort liability, 23 was lacking, subsequent
cases insisted that denial of the wrongful life cause of action was
based upon perceived public policy.
In refusing to award damages, the court in Shaheen v.
Knight24 explained that "to allow damages for the normal birth
20. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979).
21. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). Christensen was a deceit action
against a surgeon who performed a vasectomy upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought suit when his wife, who experienced great difficulty in the birth
of her first child, became pregnant and delivered another baby. The Christensen court affirmed a dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to allege fraudulent intent, a necessary element of a deceit
action. The importance of the decision, however, lies not in its holding, but
rather its dicta.
22. The Christensen court stated: "Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child." Therefore, the
damages demanded to compensate the plaintiff for the expenses of pregnancy and for his anxiety over his wife's health were "remote" from the
purpose of the operation, which was to safeguard the health of the mother.
The court added, "[A] s well might the plaintiff charge defendant with the
cost of nurture and education of the child during its minority." Id. at 126,
255 N.W. at 622 (emphasis added). Contra, Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 318, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (1967) (court sustained cause of action,
stating: "To say, as in Christensen,that the expenses of bearing a child are
remote from the avowed purpose of an operation undertaken for the purpose of avoiding childbearing is a non sequitur").
23. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
24. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41, 43, 6 Lyc. 19, 20 (C.P. 1957) (emphasis added).
The plaintiff, Shaheen, whose contraceptive vasectomy resulted in the birth
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of a normal child is foreign to the universal public sentiment of
IT] o allow such damages would be against pubthe people ....
lic policy." While in Shaheen'the child was born healthy, in 1966
the Illinois Appellate Court decided a negligent sterilization
case, Doerr v. Villate,25 in which a mother gave birth to a retarded and physically deformed child. The only issue discussed
by the court, however, was whether the tort or contract statute
of limitations applied. The court offered no opinion on whether
the "blessing" argument would deny recovery for the birth of a
seriously defective infant.26 Nevertheless, since the court did
recognize an injury, Doerrdemonstrates the shift in judicial attitudes toward the "blessed event" concept.
The Allowance of Recovery
It is questionable whether the assumptions made by the
prior decisions regarding public policy were valid 27 when renof his fifth child, alleged as damages the costs of educating and maintaining
that child. The Pennsylvania trial court held that he could not recover, although the court did recognize that sterilization is not against public policy.
"Contraceptive sterilization," such as the vasectomy in Shaheen, is performed to prevent contraception for the purpose of limiting family size. It is
to be distinguished from "therapeutic sterilization" which is performed to
protect the physical or mental health of the mother, and from "eugenic sterilization" which is designed to prevent the propagation of mental defectives
and criminals. Driver, Population Policies of State Governments in the
United States. Some Preliminary Observations, 15 VILL. L. REV. 818 (1970).
25. 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966). In Doerr, the defendantdoctor agreed to sterilize the husband of plaintiff after she gave birth to two
retarded children.
26. Although the Doerr court offered no indication as to its opinion on
damages, Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967),
extracted this meaning: "The Doerr case makes it apparent that the compensation is ...

to replenish the family exchequer so that the new arrival

will not deprive other members of the family of what was planned as their
just share of family income." Id. at 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
For a discussion of the public policy factors militating against the parents' recovery for denial of the opportunity to abort a defective fetus, see
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Gleitman arose before
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), secured the mother's right to abort a firsttrimester fetus. See note 2 supra.
27. Courts may properly declare and apply the public policy of the community only when it is subject to virtual unanimity of opinion. Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 192 A.2d 367 (1963). The criteria for
determination of public policy have been variously described as "the community common sense and common conscience," Kintz v. Harriger, 99 Ohio
St. 240, 246, 124 N.E. 168, 175 (1919); "public morals," Liggett v. Shriver, 181
Iowa 260, 265, 164 N.W. 611, 612 (1917); and "well-settled public opinion,"
Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 623, 25 N.W.2d 638, 642 (1947).
The Shaheen court based its decision that public policy precluded recovery on its own observation coupled with a pronouncement in a 110 yearold case. It cited Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 337 (1847), for the proposition that "[t]he great end of matrimony is not the convenience of the parties, though they are necessarily embarked in it, but the procreation of
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dered. However, the radical changes which had occurred in society since the courts were initially confronted with wrongful
life claims were highlighted in 1967 by Custodio v. Bauer.28 Although hailed as a major breakthrough in the development of
the cause of action, 29 Custodio's importance rested more in its
dicta than its holding. The plaintiff submitted to a tubal ligation3 0 upon the advice of the defendent-physician that an eighth
pregnancy would aggravate a kidney and bladder condition.
Pregnancy resulted, and the parents brought suit demanding, inter alia, the costs of rearing the child.3 1 The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the California Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that the allegations stated a cause of action for
32
conventional damages.
Custodio's significance lies in its discussion of the issue of
damages. 33 The court noted that if liability was established, the
plaintiffs could recover more than nominal damages. Further, it
hypothesized that recoverable damages included pain and suffering, damages for wrongful death if the mother died or sustained injuries during delivery, the costs of rearing, and even
damages incurred because the mother would be forced to
"spread her society, comfort, care, protection and support over a
progeny. . .

." Shaheen

v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. &C.2d at 45, 6 Lyc. at 23. This

reliance has been strongly criticized. Note, Remedy for the Reluctant Parent: Physicians' Liabilityfor the Post-SterilizationConception and Birth of
Unplanned Children, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 158, 160 (1974).
28. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
29. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (1977).

30. For the definition of a tubal ligation, see note 4 supra.
31. The plaintiffs in Custodio v. Bauer alleged causes of action in negli-

gence, failure to inform, malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, and breach of contract. Damages were demanded for their ex-

penses, for injury to Mrs. Custodio, and for the costs of rearing the child.
32. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 468.

33. En passant, the Custodio court dealt with two minor issues. Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs' act of sexual intercourse constituted
an intervening cause of the injuries alleged. The court dismissed this sophism by stating that the test of an intervening cause is the foreseeability of

that event. "It is difficult to conceive how the very act the consequences of
which the operation was designed to forestall, can be considered unforesee-

able." Id. at 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
The court also noted that a therapeutic sterilization is not against public policy stating:
[T]he matter would appear to be one of individual conscience. The
question of whether the state can now control the subject may be questioned in view of the fact that the giving of information, instruction and
medical advice to married persons as to the means of preventing con-

ception is now clothed in a cloak of constitutional protection. (Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
251 Cal. App. 2d at 315, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472-73.
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larger group. ' 34 The Custodio court refused to hold that recovery should be reduced by any benefits resulting from the parentchild relationship, stating that the award could be offset solely
by any proven benefit to the plaintiff's kidney and bladder condition.35 A more flexible approach to the application of the "benefits" rule was espoused four years later in a case which may be
36
termed the third generation in the lineage of wrongful life.
Troppi v. Scarf,37 a wrongful conception case, unambiguously rejected the argument that public policy precluded recovery of damages for an unplanned child. 38 Further, the court
discussed the "benefits" rule 39 and held that the benefits of the
unplanned child could be weighed against all the elements of
damage claimed by the plaintiffs. 40 Thus, recovery of the costs
34. Id. at 318, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
35. Id. This holding resulted from Custodio's narrow view of a rule, advanced as a rationale for the "blessing" concept, which provides that
"where the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or
his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a special benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is
considered in mitigation of damages, where this is equitable." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939). Rather than applying this rule to require mitigation for the benefit of parenting, Custodiofocused on the words "benefit to
the interestwhich was harmed" and refused to mitigate since the defendant
failed to demonstrate that Mrs. Custodio's kidney and bladder condition
was benefited since the purpose of the operation was to protect her health.
36. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
37. Troppi was an action for damages allegedly resulting from the birth
of a child to Mrs. Troppi after the defendant-pharmacist negligently filled
her birth control pill prescription with tranquilizers. Plaintiffs alleged as
damages the wife's lost wages; her medical and hospital expenses; the pain
and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth; and the costs of rearing. Id. at 243,
187 N.W.2d at 513.
38. The Troppi court examined Michigan statutes which were designed
to foster the use of contraceptives and discussed the constitutional protection of their use provided by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
The court concluded that damages should be assessed as in any other negligence case, stating that "public policy favors a tort scheme which encourages pharmacists to exercise great care in filling prescriptions. To absolve
the defendant of all liability here would be to remove one deterrent against
[negligence]. [Sluch absolution cannot be defended on public policy
grounds." 31 Mich. App. at 248, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
39. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939); see note 35 supra.

40. The Troppi court rejected Custodio's narrow view of the "benefits"
rule and held that all the benefits of the child could be weighed against all
the damages, stating: "Since pregnancy and its attendant anxiety, incapacity, pain and suffering are inextricably related to child bearing, we do not
think it would be sound to attempt to separate those segments of damage
from the economic costs of an unplanned child in applying the 'same interest' rule." 31 Mich. App. at 248, 187 N.W.2d at 518. This rejected the plaintiff's argument that only the costs of rearing should be offset by the value of
a parental reward. Even the damages related to the pregnancy (which, arguably, would not be affected by a relationship developed after birth) were
held to be subject to diminution by the benefits of the birth of the child.
Contra, Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978) (reversed trial court's application of benefits rule to ac-
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of rearing the infant to majority was allowed, subject to diminution by the value of the child's birth to the parent. Although this
weighing of benefits against alleged damages has been criticized, 4 1 the Troppi analysis provided a flexible and serviceable
approach to resolution of wrongful life claims which stood in
sharp contrast to the doctrinaire decisions preceding it.
Despite the well-reasoned Troppi opinion, cases in the
wrongful life area remain in conflict. 42 While the courts have
struggled to formulate an appropriate method of computing
damages, two discernible trends have emerged on the recoverability of the costs of rearing a child. Awards of rearing costs are
gaining increasing acceptance among jurisdictions which have
faced the claim. 4 3 However, other courts have refused to allow
tion for wrongful pregnancy). See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text
supra. "The benefits rule set forth in Troppi should not apply to an action
narrowly confined to damages for wrongful pregnancy and not wrongful life.
To the extent this is inconsistent with Troppi, we stand in disagreement."
83 Mich. App. at 456, 268 N.W.2d at 685.
41. One student author protests:
The theory behind the [Troppi] benefits rule is sound .... But to
arrive at an artificial figure representing the value of having a child, and
then to subtract that from a gross figure for damages is needless complication. For instance, a danger exists that the aggravating circumstances, as for example the age of the mother, may be considered twice,
first in increasing the amount of gross damage, and second in decreasing the value of the benefit incurred.
Comment, Busting the Blessing Balloon: Liabilityfor the Birth of the Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REV. 221, 231 (1975).
42. Compare Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd,
349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) and Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974) (denying any recovery to parents) with Rivera v. State, 94
Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978) and Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic,
260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (allowing full recovery, including costs of rearing).
43. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (failure to advise of risks of defects, medical costs of rearing recoverable); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (negligent abortion, normal tort damages recoverable); Custodio v. Bauer, 251
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (negligent sterilization, costs of
rearing recoverable); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d
204 (1976) (negligent sterilization, costs of rearing recoverable); Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (negligent sterilization,
costs of rearing recoverable); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d
511 (1971) (negligent dispensation of oral contraceptives, costs of rearing
recoverable); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977)
(negligent sterilization, costs of rearing less value of child's society allowed); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975) (negligent sterilization, all damages proximately resulting from negligence,
including costs of rearing, recoverable); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
387 N.E.2d 217, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (negligent failure to advise of birth
defects, costs of care and treatment of defective child recoverable); Ziemba
v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (negligent misdiagnosis
of pregnancy, costs of rearing recoverable); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157,
404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (negligent sterilization, costs of rearing recoverable); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
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rearing costs, limiting recovery to those damages incurred during pregnancy. 44 Another area of controversy surrounds the
45
award of damages for the emotional suffering of the parents.
Wilczynski v. Goodman46 represents the initial attempt by the
Illinois courts to deal with the difficult damages issues
presented in wrongful life actions.
WILCZYNSKI V. GOODMAN

In January, 1976 Jean Wilczynski underwent a therapeutic
(negligent sterilization and misdiagnosis of pregnancy, costs of rearing recoverable if proven); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496
(1976) (negligent sterilization, one twin was healthy, the other defective,
costs of rearing both held recoverable); Stribling v. de Quevedo, [1980] 6
FAM L. REP. (BNA) 2299 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1980) (negligent sterilization, costs of rearing defective child recoverable) Speck v. Finegold, No. GD
76-07752 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 25, 1979) (negligent sterilization and negligent
abortion, costs of rearing defective child recoverable); Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (negligent failure to advise of birth defects, costs
of rearing related to defects recoverable); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 9
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (negligent failure to advise of birth defects, medical costs of rearing defective child recoverable).
44. See LaPoint v. Shirley, 409 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (negligent
sterilization, costs of rearing denied); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757
(Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (negligent sterilization, costs
of rearing held speculative and conjectural); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill.
App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (negligent abortion, costs of rearing denied
as contrary to public policy favoring right of unborn to life); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (negligent failure to advise of risks of birth
defects, costs of rearing mongoloid child not recoverable); Clegg v. Chase,
89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (negligent failure to sterilize, costs of rearing normal infant denied); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (negligent sterilization, costs of rearing not recoverable); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64
Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974) (negligent misdiagnosis of pregnancy,
costs of rearing not recoverable).
45. The following cases have allowed parents of unplanned or defective
children to recover damages for mental anguish: Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967) (negligent sterilization, healthy child); Green
v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (failure to sterilize,
healthy fourth child); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn.
1977) (negligent sterilization, healthy child); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,
404 A.2d 8 (1979) (negligent failure to advise of birth defects, mongoloid
child); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (negligent
failure to advise of birth defects, child born with rubella syndrome).
Other courts have refused to award damages for mental suffering to
wrongful life plaintiffs: Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 387 N.E.2d 217, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (negligent failure to advise of birth defects, defective
child); Howard v. Lecher, 53 A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976), affd, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (negligent failure to advise
of birth defects); Stribling v. de Quevedo, [1980] 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2299
(Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 1980) (negligent sterilization, defective child); Speck
v. Finegold, No. GD 76-07752 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 25, 1979) (negligent sterilization and abortion, defective child).
46. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979).
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abortion 47 performed by Dr. Raymond Goodman. The pregnancy was not terminated, and the plaintiff, Wilczynski, gave
birth to a healthy child. She brought suit against the physician
and charged him with negligence and breaches of contract and
warranty, alleging as damages, inter alia, the costs of rearing
the child.48 The trial court dismissed the complaint, 49 and the
plaintiff appealed.
The Illinois Appellate Court50 affirmed the dismissal of the
breach of contract and warranty counts. 51 The dismissal of the
negligence count, however, was reversed and the cause remanded for trial. In discussing plaintiff's asserted damages, the
Wilczynski court read the complaint as having pleaded a legally
sanctioned abortion 52 but, after examining Illinois public policy
on the right to life as legislatively declared in the Illinois Abortion Law, 53 decided that the existence of "a normal, healthy life
47. A therapeutic abortion (for the definition of an abortion, see note 6
supra), is one that is performed when the mental or physical health of the
mother is endangered by the continuation of her pregnancy. DAVIS, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY A-6 (12th ed. 1973).
48. The plaintiff alleged that her damages included expenses for the
abortion, for medical and hospital costs related to the pregnancy and childbirth, and for the costs of raising and educating the child. 73 Ill. App. 3d at
53, 391 N.E.2d at 481.
49. The decision of the trial court was rendered by the Hon. David A.
Canel, Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County.
50. Mr. Justice Hartmann of the First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court delivered the opinion in which Messrs. Justice Stamos and Perlin
concurred.
51. Wilczynski relied on Rogala v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571
(1973), in rejecting the contract and warranty claims on the ground that no
separate consideration had been alleged. Rogala was a breach of warranty
action against a physician who allegedly assured Mrs. Rogala that he would
perform a sterilization during the Caesarean delivery of her fifth child and
that no more pregnancies would occur. The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's dismissal stating that "if the Illinois courts would consider enforceable such a warranty by a physician, it would be necessary to allege
and prove the making of the warranty, the plaintiffs reliance thereon and a
separate consideration." Id. at 65, 305 N.E.2d at 572.
52. The Wilczynski court focused on the fact that the abortion was performed for therapeutic reasons and concluded that such an action did not
contravene either the precepts of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see note 2
supra, or the legislatively established public policy favoring life over abortion. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 58, 391 N.E.2d at 485. The court specifically reserved
opinion on the issues presented by cases where the abortion was performed
for nontherapeutic reasons. Id. at 58 n.3, 391 N.E.2d at 485 n.3.
53. Wilczynski cited the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, which provides in
pertinent part:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to
reasonably regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way
restricting the right of privacy of a woman or the right of a woman to an
abortion under those decisions, the General Assembly of the State of
Illinois do solemnly declare and find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child is a human being from the
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is an esteemed right under our laws, rather than a compensable
wrong. '54 Therefore, damages in the form of costs of rearing the
child were not recognized. 55 The court held, however, that those
damages related to the pregnancy itself were compensable,
since their recovery did not involve any judgment as to the
child's right to life.

56

The Wilczynski holding is based upon an application of the
public policy regarding abortion to a cost of rearing award in a
wrongful life case. The court's reasoning is somewhat tenuous.
Whether the assumed relationship between tort damages and
abortion exists is questionable. Further, the court's opinion is
not only inconsistent with recent decisions in the wrongful life
area, 57 but is also inconsistent within itself.
The Relevance of the Illinois Abortion Law
The purpose of tort law is to provide compensation to those
persons wrongfully injured in the pursuit of a legal right.5 8
Since the right of a potential mother to terminate her pregnancy
has been secured,5 9 the negligent interference with that right
gives rise to legal damages. Tort damages are measured by comparing the condition the plaintiff would have been in, had the
time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the
unborn child's right to life, and is entitled to the right of life from conception....

ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 38, § 81-21 (1977).

54. 73 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 391 N.E.2d at 488.
55. The Wilczynski court said:
In our judgment, a public policy which deems precious even potential
life while yet in the womb, at such cost and expense that condition may
entail, does not countenance as compensable damage to its parent or
parents those additional costs and expenses necessary to sustain and
nurture that life once it comes to fruition upon and after successful
birth.
Id.
56. In finding the damages related to the pregnancy recoverable, the
Wilczynski court distinguished rearing expenses, stating: "Damages based
upon hospital and medical costs attending plaintiff's unwanted pregnancy,
as they affect her person, have little to do with the child's right to life and its
concomitant expense of upbringing and education." Id. at 63, 391 N.E.2d at
489.
57. See, e.g., Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978)
(allowing costs of rearing not against public policy); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 387 N.E.2d 217, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (allowing costs of caring
for defective child who was born after defendant-physician negligently
failed to test for defects); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950
(Ct. Cl. 1978) (recovery of costs of rearing not against public policy); Speck
v. Finegold, No. GD 76-07752 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 25, 1979) (allowance of
costs of rearing not against public policy).
58. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 703, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652, 656
(1976).
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see note 2 supra.
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defendant not been negligent, with the plaintiff's subsequent
impaired condition. 60
Wilczynski's discussion of the policy stated in the Illinois
Abortion Law 6 1 is inapposite to this analysis. This is obvious
when it is applied to other fact patterns. For example, if the
physician had negligently performed a therapeutic sterilization
which resulted in pregnancy and birth, the court's discussion of
the public policy against abortion would be decidedly not germane. Wilczynski's focus on the fact that the birth followed a
negligent termination of pregnancy ignores the broader issue of
negligent interference with reproductive rights.
Comparison of Wilczynski to Other Recent Decisions
One recently decided negligent sterilization case dismissed
public policy as a basis for denial of recovery. In so holding, Rivera v. State62 reasoned that such a position would run afoul of
the spirit of Griswold v. Connecticut63 that certain matters, such
as the right to use contraceptives, are of strictly private concern. 64 The Rivera court recognized the fundamental nature of
the right to plan one's family and concluded that when such a
right has been violated, the law must provide a remedy. 65 Rivera went so far as to question the validity of even the assertion
that public policy required the denial of recovery based on the
60. Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 73, 344 A.2d 336, 339-40

(1975).
61. For a reproduction of the Illinois Abortion Law relied upon in Wilczynski, see note 53 supra.
62. 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Rivera arose out of a
negligent sterilization. The Court of Claims held that the plaintiff stated a
valid cause of action in medical malpractice for damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering incident to pregnancy, and for the anticipated
costs of rearing the unwanted child. The Rivera court also rejected an argument which represents the converse of the Wilczynski holding. Defendant
asserted that the plaintiff was required to have an abortion once the pregnancy was diagnosed in order to mitigate damages. The court replied: "A
rule of law which required claimant to have an abortion would constitute an
invasion of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious kind." Id. at 161, 404
N.Y.S.2d at 954.
63. See note 2 supra.
64. The Rivera court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
for the proposition that the decision to limit one's family size involves an
intimate relation between husband and wife and the role of their physician
in one aspect of that relation. From that the court concluded that "[w ] here
a physician's negligence results in the birth of an unwanted child, a substantial interference with the fundamental rights of the parents occurs,
which may well have catastrophic consequences. . .

."

Id.

at 162, 404

N.Y.S.2d at 953. The Rivera court observed that "this is especially true of
the Riveras who already had five children." Id. at 162 n.5, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953
n.5.
65. Id. at 164, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
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birth of a child. 66 Rivera's statement that Griswold precludes
the denial of rearing costs on public policy grounds 67 indicates
that Wilczynski stands in clear contradiction to the United
States Supreme Court's tripartite enunciation on reproductive
68
rights.
A recent Pennsylvania wrongful life case, whose facts,
though bizarre, were similar to Wilczynski, reached a different
result than the Illinois court. Speck v. Finegold69 allowed the
plaintiffs, the victims of both a negligent vasectomy and a negligent abortion, to recover the costs of rearing their defective
child. The Speck court specifically rejected the trial court's reasoning that the sanctity of life precluded recovery, stating that
the issue was not the value and preciousness
of life but, rather,
70
whether the defendants were negligent.
Speck found Griswold and Roe v. Wade controlling on the
question of whether public policy prevented recovery predicated upon a negligent abortion. 7 1 Although Speck is somewhat
distinguishable from Wilczynski because the Pennsylvania
abortion statutes do not propound public policy views on the
right to life, its resolution authorizing recovery of rearing costs
casts doubt on the Illinois opinion's precedential value. It seems
axiomatic that legislative pronouncements must yield to the
66. 'This idea [that the birth of a child cannot be regarded as a wrong]
holds a place of importance in many people's religious and philosophical
beliefs, although it is by no means shared by all." Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at
953.
67. Rivera rejected the same public policy argument raised by the defendant in Wilczynski, stating: "It is no answer to say that a result which

claimant specifically sought to avoid, might be regarded as a blessing by
someone else. Such a position would cast upon the sea of public opinion
what the Supreme Court has declared to be a matter of strictly private concern." Id. at 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
68. See note 2 supra.
69. No. GD 76-07752 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 25, 1979). The facts of this case

are compelling. In Speck, the plaintiff and his two children were victims of
a crippling disease of the fibrous structures of the nerves, known as
neurofibromatosis. He consulted his physician, Dr. Finegold, about a vasectomy in order to prevent further transmittal of the disease. Dr. Finegold
performed the vasectomy, but Mrs. Speck became pregnant. The parents
then conferred with Dr. Schwartz and engaged him to perform an abortion.
He did so and, in the face of Mrs. Speck's protestations that the pregnancy
was continuing, persistently assured her that the abortion was successful.
Mrs. Speck later delivered a premature infant afflicted with neurofibromatosis, and plaintiffs brought suit for negligence against both doctors demanding, inter alia, the costs of caring for the infant.
70. Id. (slip op. at 7).

71. The Speck court stated that "[t]he last vestige of this public policy
view was eliminated in [those] two cases decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States (citations omitted)." Id. at 8. For a synopsis of the decisions in Griswold and Roe, see note 2 supra.
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mandates of the nation's highest court, but the holding in Wilczynski implies otherwise.
The Internal Inconsistency of Wilczynski
Wilczynski v. Goodman72 refused to allow recovery of rearing costs, but it did uphold the recoverability of damages related
to the pregnancy. Wilczynski distinguished the two awards,
finding that the former disparaged the infant's right to life while
the latter did not.73 This distinction may be applauded as equitable in that it provides at least some recovery to the injured
plaintiff and a measure of deterrence to the negligent defendant.7 4 It cannot, however, be hailed as logical. Troppi v. Scarf
held that the damages from a pregnancy and the birth of the
child were not separable for the purpose of applying the "benefits" rule. 75 This statement applies equally as well to the denial
or award of damages based upon a public policy against abortion. Wilczynski is internally inconsistent because the award of
pregnancy related damages recognizes the pregnancy as an injury. If the birth of the child is not cognizable as an injury due
to considerations of public policy, then neither should pregnancy, a necessary precursor to childbirth. Recognition of both
types of awards would properly include an understanding that
neither denigrates the child's right to life; rather, they merely
effect a full recovery for tortious interference with parental reproductive rights.
THE COSTS OF REARING AWARD

Limitation of awards in wrongful life cases to those damages
related to pregnancy, as in Wilczynski, 76 betrays traditional tort
72. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979).

73. The distinction between these two awards is set forth in the following enigmatic statement by the Wilczynski court, "Damages based upon
hospital and medical costs attending plaintiff's unwanted pregnancy, as
they affect her person, have little to do with the child's right to life and its
concomitant expense of upbringing and education." Id. at 63, 391 N.E.2d at

489.
74. Deterrence may well have been the motivating force behind the specious differentiation of the two awards. The Wilczynski court noted: "The
practical effect of such a position [denying all recovery] would allow tortious conduct by a medical practitioner in such cases to be totally uncompensable. Further, unwarranted immunity would thereby be extended to

the medical profession if damages ensuing from improper treatment were
to be denied." Id.
75. See notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
76. Wilczynski buttressed its denial of the rearing costs by stating that
recognition of this award should emanate from the legislature, citing
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964). This reliance on Zepeda is misplaced because in that case the illegi-
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principles of recovery. The general rule of damages in a tort action is that the defendant is liable for all the injuries proximately resulting from his wrongful act. 77 There is no valid
reason to depart from this rule in wrongful life cases by awarding the relatively minor pregnancy related damages and denying
the more substantial rearing costs. 78 The argument supporting
the recovery of the costs of raising the child is particularly compelling when the unplanned child suffers from serious birth de7 9
fects and requires constant medical care.
The curtailment of damages to those resulting from the
pregnancy can be traced to Coleman v. Garrison.80 The Coleman court recognized the injury to the plaintiff and awarded
damages for wrongful pregnancy. 8 1 However, it felt that the
value of a child's life should not vary with the circumstances of
its birth and refused to award rearing costs. It was feared that
assessing the costs of rearing the child in different family circumstances would invite "speculation" and would be "ethically
questionable. '82 A recent Michigan Appellate Court case 83 relied on Coleman in awarding only the pregnancy related damtimate infant was suing its father for wrongful life. Such claims by infants
have been universally denied. See note 8 supra. Further, the argument
that recognition of rearing costs should await legislative action was rejected
in Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In refusing

to acquiesce to the suggestion that any recovery should be initiated by the
legislature, the Rivera court stated: "The fundamental principles of tort law

were created by the courts not legislatures. Where legislatures have entered the field, it has frequently been in response to the unwillingness of
the judiciary to respond to changing times or to depart from stare decisis."
Id. at 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 953.

77. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 245, 187 N.W.2d 511, 514 (1971).
78. Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 130 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (Cadena,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).

79. Indeed, although the Texas courts have refused to award the costs of
rearing a healthy child, where the child is defective, the parents may re-

cover those expenses allocable to the defective condition. Compare Terrell
v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974) and Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) with Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).

For a discussion of the annual costs for treatment of defective children,
see note 14 supra.
80. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1974), affd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). The

plaintiffs in Coleman were the victims of a negligent sterilization. They
sought damages for the costs of rearing the child, and the trial court entered

summary judgment in favor of defendant on that issue.
81. See notes 16 &17 and accompanying text supra. It was the Coleman
case which dubbed the cause of action "wrongful pregnancy," while re-

stricting recoverable damages to Mrs. Coleman's pain and discomfort during pregnancy and her medical expenses, the outlay for the unsuccessful
tubal ligation, and Mr. Coleman's loss of consortium during her confinement.
82. The court said:
To make such a determination would, indeed, raise the unfortunate
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ages. This indication of Coleman's continuing vitality 84 is
unfortunate.
The Coleman rationale for denying the costs of rearing is an
abdication of judicial responsibility. To measure the effect of a
child's birth into families with varying financial and emotional
circumstances is no more speculative than to make a comparison of the value of the loss of an arm to a quarterback as opposed to a judge. 85 Damages measuring the value of a husband's
loss of consortium are as "ethically questionable" as those
based upon the birth of an unplanned child. The law makes
such difficult evaluations as a matter of course. Moreover, difficulty in assessing damages is no excuse for denying recovery for
86
those which are the proximate result of tortious conduct.
The Propriety of a Setoff for Benefits Conferred
Despite a few decisions to the contrary, the trend of recent
decisions favors the award of rearing costs. 87 However, even
those courts which allow the award conflict on the question of
whether recovery should be diminished by the value to the parent of the parent-child relationship. One view would rarely require diminution. 8 8 For example, if the plaintiff-mother
underwent a sterilization to protect her emotional health and
later discovered that the birth resulting from defendant's negligence actually benefited her emotional health, the award would
be diminished by the value of that benefit. However, if the parents sought to protect the mother's physical health by submitting to a sterilization, no setoff would be required unless the
birth of the child enhanced the mother's health.
prospect of ruling, as a matter of law, that under certain circumstances
a child would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to bring
him into the world. It is not difficult to understand the reluctance of
many distinguished jurists to find that the birth of a child is an injury

for which the plaintiff should deserve an award of damages.
327 A.2d at 761.
83. Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268
N.W.2d 683 (1978).
84. But see Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978)
(allowing costs of rearing).
85. For a discussion of the various factors which would affect the parents' recovery in wrongful life cases, see notes 87-91 and accompanying text
infra.

86. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359, 378-79 (1972); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 562-66 (1931); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260-62, 187
N.W.2d 511, 520-21 (1971).

87. See note 43 supra.
88. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 503, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); see
note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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The better view recognizes the benefits which most persons
receive from parenting, regardless of the reason they decided to
limit the size of their family. 89 Under this approach, recovery
could be denied if the benefits were held to outweigh the damages. For example, where the parents merely plan to forestall,
rather than forego, parenthood, the jury could arrive at a
recovery figure representing net damages from an unplanned
child by deducting the perceived benefit of parenthood. In this
instance, because the parents planned to conceive anyway and
would have voluntarily incurred the expenses, albeit at a later
time, the resulting computation would be a negative figure denoting no recovery.
The Determination of Net Recovery
This system, however, has been criticized as needlessly
complicated, 90 and alternative proposals include a system
designed to coordinate two factors: the urgency of the parents'
reason for seeking to limit their family size and their socio-economic status.9 1 But even pursuant to this procedure, the couple
89. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); see notes 39
& 40 supra.
90. See note 41 supra.
91. The two factors are plotted on the graph below. The coordination of

a couple's socio-economic status and the urgency of the reason for limiting
their family size produces a point which lies within one of the "bands of
recovery." As the bands move inward toward the intersection of the coordinates, recovery decreases until only nominal damages can be obtained. An
example of a low urgency value would be the fear of physical harm to the
mother with no physical harm resulting from the pregnancy. A higher
value of the "urgency" coordinate would result where the parents were not

married.

Socio-

Economic
Status

(decreasing)j

Urgency of the Reason for Limiting
Family Size (increasing)
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in the aforementioned example, who merely planned to postpone raising a family, could never recover the full cost of rearing
the unplanned child. Yet, their award of damages would be increased as their socio-economic status decreased. If the purpose of the sterilization was to prevent the birth of a defective
child, and the child was born suffering from defects; then the full
costs of rearing the child should be awarded, since the reason
for the contraceptive measure was an urgent one. However, as
the parents' socio-economic status increased, recovery would be
decreased.
Regardless of the method used to determine its value, generally some benefit to the parents should be recognized. 92 Excessive awards can also be prevented by the use of clear jury
instructions on the matter of setoff for benefits and special interrogatories 93 which require the jury to indicate the various factors used to determine the damage award. A just system of
recovery in wrongful life actions harmonizes the view that children are a benefit with a realization that there is some detriment
to the parent whose procreative rights are interfered with by a
defendant's negligence.
CONCLUSION

The cause of action for wrongful life has emerged as an inevitable concomitant of the birth control revolution. The assertion
that the birth of a child is a legal damage is a novel one, and the
initial reaction of the judiciary was to view the injury as
damnum absque injuria. The public policy judgment on which
this determination was based, if ever valid, has certainly yielded
to the United States Supreme Court's pronouncements 94 concerning an individual's right to limit his or her family size.
It is clear that the action to redress negligent interference
with reproductive rights is legally cognizable. The determination of recoverable damages, however, remains clouded by obscure and outmoded interjections of public policy into the
analysis of the cause of action. It is urged that the Illinois courts
Note, Redressing a Blessing: The Question of Damagesfor Negligently Performed Sterilization Operations,33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 886, 897-98 (1972).
92. Most parents would admit to some reward from the parent-child re-

lationship, at least where the child is normal and healthy.
93. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977), held:
'To assist the jury in measuring the various and complex elements of damages, we finally require that all future action for wrongful conception be
submitted to the jury with a special verdict form and with explanatory instructions."
94. See note 2 supra.
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reject the holding of Wilczynski v. Goodman95 that Illinois public policy on the fetal right to life 96 requires the denial of the
costs of rearing award. Recovery of rearing costs is not an aspersion upon the rights of the unborn. It is a reflection of the
magnitude of the parents' right to control their reproductive activity, and as such it should be recognized in Illinois.
MargaretJ. Mullen

95. 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979).
96. A recent Illinois Supreme Court decision serves to diminish the importance of the state's public policy on the right to life and thus, arguably,
constitutes an implied rejection of Wilczynski's rationale. People v. Greer,
No. 51214 (Ill. Feb. 22, 1980), held that taking the life of a fetus was not murder under the current Illinois statute. The decision was based upon the
court's consideration of (1) the status of the unborn at common law, (2)
sister state opinions on the question, and (3) the attitude reflected in the
Illinois Abortion Act. Accord, State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1979). But
cf. Wrongful Death of a Non-Viable Fetus: A New Cause of Action, Pub. Act
No. 81-946 effective date Jan. 1, 1980, 1979 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2295-96 (West) (to
be codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2.2) (the state of gestation or development of the plaintiff shall not foreclose maintenance of a wrongful death
action).

